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EVIDENCE-Illinois Adopts Rule 609 of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence on Impeachment of a DefendantWitness by His Prior Crimes.
Ruth Bennett agreed to cooperate with Officer Kenneth Burt of the
Chicago Police Department in arranging for the arrest of her marijuana
supplier. In exchange for this cooperation, charges against her for
unlawful possession of marijuana were to be dropped. That evening
she accompanied Officers Burt and Leonard Lawrence to the Melody
Lane Tavern. Ruth Bennett was searched, given $20 in marked money,
and entered the tavern. She returned a short time later, and handed the
officers two envelopes containing marijuana. The officers entered the
tavern, and subsequently had Ellis Montgomery, the night manager,
empty his pockets. The marked $20 was found among the contents.
Montgomery was thereupon arrested for the unlawful sale of a narcotic
drug.
At Montgomery's trial, Ruth Bennett testified that the defendant,
whom she had known for over a year, had agreed on November 14, over
the telephone, to sell her some marijuana that evening at the tavern. She
also described how the marijuana was sold to her by the defendant in
exchange for the marked money. The officers then testified that upon
entering the tavern, they immediately recognized the defendant from
Ruth Bennett's description, discovered the marked money on his person, and arrested him. The defendant testified that on that evening he
had not talked to Ruth Bennett, but that she did talk to the bartender.
The defendant further testified that the bartender afterwards had given
him $135 in cash, including the $20 in marked money, so that he
could purchase some whiskey for the tavern. He also maintained that
he had had a whiskey list in his pocket when arrested. The offficers,
on the other hand, could recall neither a whiskey list nor any additional
money in the defendant's possession. The tavern's bartender did not
testify.
For purposes of impeaching the defendant's credibility, the prosecution read into evidence a certified copy of a prior conviction for robbery.
The defendant made no objection, even though the conviction was in
1947, when he was only 18 years of age. The jury subsequently found
the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.
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In his motion for a new trial the defendant contended that the prior
conviction, because of its type and remoteness in time, was unrelated
to his credibility. The trial judge denied the motion on the ground that
under Illinois law he was without discretion to exclude any prior conviction offered by the prosecution. On a direct appeal, the Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed' the conviction and remanded the case for a
new trial. The court found that the 21 year old conviction for robbery
bore no "rational relationship" to credibility and should not have been3
admitted. 2 The court also construed the relevant Illinois statute,
which provides that a conviction "may" be shown to impeach credibility, as conferring discretion upon the trial judge as to the admissibility
of such a prior conviction of a defendant.4
People v. Montgomery is significant because it overturns the rule in
Illinois that a trial judge must admit a prior conviction of an infamous
crime whenever it is introduced by the prosecution for purposes of impeaching a defendant-witness. Judges instead will be allowed to consider the prejudicial effect of the evidence, and its probative value in
ruling upon the prior conviction's admissibility.
Of perhaps greater significance is the court's rationale in Montgomery. It indicates that Illinois will adopt neither of the established
approaches to determining the admissibility of prior convictions. Rather,
it adopts the proposed federal rule, a third approach which may contain elements of the other two.
THE

Two

EXISTING APPROACHES

The admission of prior convictions for purposes of impeaching a witness has long been the rule in most jurisdictions. 5 This practice of admission, virtually unlimited by the type or severity of the past crime, has
been recently attacked on two grounds. The relevancy of a past
crime to present truth-telling has been attacked, particularly where
that crime is not limited to one involving dishonest conduct. 6 Where
1. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
2. Id.
3. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, Sec. 155-1 (1969). The statute provides: "No person
shall be disqualified as a witness in any criminal case or proceeding by reason of his
interest in the event of the same party or otherwise, or by reason of his having been
convicted of any crime; but such interest or conviction may be shown for the purpose
of affecting his credibility ......
(Emphasis supplied). Only "infamous" crimes may
be used to impeach, Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill. 601, 44 Am. Rep. 97 (1882),
Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, Sec. 124-1 lists "infamous" crimes.
4. People v. Montgomery, 47 Il1. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
5. See III Wigmore on Evidence Sec. 488 (3rd ed. 1940) for a collection of the

relevant state statutes.
6.

Ladd, Credibility Tests--Current Trends, 89 V.P.A. L. Rev. 166 (1940).
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the witness is the accused, the more subtle problem of possible jury
prejudice appears. A defendant with prior convictions is faced with
the difficult choice of telling his story and risking prejudicial inferences of guilt from the jury's learning of his past crimes, or not testifying,
losing the opportunity to explain his version of the case, and risking the
inference that he has something to hide.' This risk of prejudice would
have the result of causing a defendant who was convicted of a crime of
violence, logically remote from the issue of credibility, to face the
same dilemma as one who was a convicted perjurer. Attempts to
solve these problems resulted in two very different approaches: the
Luck-Gordon rule and Model Code of Evidence Rule 106.
In those jurisdictions which have a statute providing that prior convictions "may" be introduced to impeach a witness, "may" has been
consistently held to vest discretion to introduce those convictions in
the prosecution." Once a witness had testified, the prosecution could,
and invariably did, introduce evidence of a prior conviction of the
witness to attack his credibility. 9 There was no question of the trial
judge not admitting such evidence, for the statute had already determined that evidence of prior "infamous crimes" were always relevant to
the issue of credibility.
In Luck v. United States,10 however, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia construed the word "may" in the District of Columbia statute 1 as conferring discretion upon the trial judge to exclude evidence of prior convictions introduced solely to impair the credibility of a defendant-witness. The court felt that Congress would have
provided that past convictions "shall" be admitted if the intent was to
provide that the trial judge was obligated to admit any conviction
that the prosecution saw fit to introduce. In exercising this discretion,
the judge was to balance the probative value of past convictions for purposes of impeaching the accused against the prejudice that might result
from such evidence.' 2 If the resultant prejudice would "far outweigh"
7. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1021 (1965).
8. See, e.g., People v. Buford, 396 Ill. 158, 71 N.E.2d 340 (1947).
9. ". . . notwithstanding the urgent need of prosecutors for expanded resources to
investigate and present criminal cases effectively, the legislature should face up to such

needs rather than to remain content with 'cut-rate convictions gotten with the aid of

prior criminal records.'" U.S. v. Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1970) quoting
Blakney v. U.S., 397 F.2d 648, 649-50 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
10. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (dictum).
11. The District of Columbia is much like Ch. 38 Sec. 155-1 Ill. Rev. Stat. The
statute provides in part: "A person is not incompetent to testify . . . by reason of

his having been convicted of crime. The fact of conviction may be given in evidence to affect his credibility as a witness.... ".14
D.C. Code 305 (Emphasis
supplied).

12.
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the probative value of the convictions or if the need to hear the defendant was great, the trial judge, in his discretion, could exclude the convictions as evidence for impeachment.1" The nature of the past crimes,
the length of the criminal record, and the "age and circumstances" of
the defendant were listed by the court as possible factors to be considered in the trial judge's determination.
In Gordon v. United States,14 the court supplemented these factors
with a "rule of thumb."' 15 A conviction based upon dishonest conduct,
the court reasoned, would generally relate to the veracity of the individual, while violent crimes would generally be more indicative of a
short temper than of dishonesty.'" The court also indicated that the degree of remoteness in time of the prior conviction was proportionate
to that conviction's bearing on veracity.' 7 Coupled with a consideration of the remoteness of the. prior conviction, should be an examination by the judge of the accused's conduct since the conviction.' 8 The
relation of a conviction for a crime involving dishonesty apparently
could be blunted by intervening time and a legally blameless life.' 9
Finally, the Gordon court cautioned against the extreme possibilities
for prejudice if the accused's prior crime was the same, or substantially the same, as the crime for which he was on trial. 20 It was suggested these prior convictions should be admitted sparingly, and only
when the conviction was one related to veracity. 2' The court stated
that a non-jury hearing would often be necessary to enable the trial
judge to make a reasoned decision. 2 2 In this kind of hearing, the accused would testify, and the prosecution would be allowed to crossexamine before a decision about the admissibility of the conviction was
made. 23
Although the doctrine of Luck has subsequently been applied by the
In State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967), the court reversed the ruling

of a trial judge who relied on the Luck discretion in holding a prior conviction inad-

missible. The Court found the Luck construction of the statute "strained" and unacceptable. Justice Weintraub (concurring) pointed out that the New Jersey legislators
by passing the statute had already determined that the probative value of prior conviction
outweighed any possible prejudice. Thus, the court held the trial judge had no discretion to exclude proffered past convictions. Hawthorne has attracted a following of
its own. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. West, 258 N.E.2d 22 (Mass. 1970).
13. 348 F.2d at 768.
14. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
15. Id. at 940.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18.

Id.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 941.
Id.
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District of Columbia Court of Appeals to all witnesses,2 4 the doctrine
has not been significantly extended. In fact, the cases since Luck and
Gordon have demonstrated that the applicability of Luck is the distinct
exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, the burden is upon the defendant not only to raise the Luck issue, but to persuade the trial judge
that in his particular case the facts justify excluding a prior conviction
pursuant to the mandate of Luck2 5 As then Judge Burger said in
Evans v. United States:
[I]t is not enough merely to refer to the Luck-Gordon standards
and then to sit back. The defense must show how and why this case
calls for a discretionary "exemption" from the impeachment permitted by statute. Nor, by the same token, will merely stating
that it is important
for the defendant to testify be sufficient to meet
26
this burden.
If the defendant does meet the burden of demonstrating his particular need for testifying, he still must demonstrate the possibility of undue prejudice which might result if his prior conviction was introduced.2 7 Even assuming that the dual burdens of Evans are met, the
judge may still consider the Gordon "rule of thumb" and disallow the
Luck request.
Despite periodic proposals that Luck be broadened,2 8 any extension
of that doctrine was unlikely in view of the position on impeachment
by prior convictions taken by rule 6-09 of the preliminary draft of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 29 This proposed rule allowed admission
of any prior conviction for purposes of impeaching a witness, so long as
the conviction was punishable by at least one year in prison, and the
witness' release from prison had occurred within the past ten years.
24. Davis v. U.S., 409 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Although many of the same
reasons may exist for extending the rule to include all witnesses, the prejudicial effect
of impeaching a non-defendant witness has been largely ignored in judicial and academic

circles.
25. See Evans v. U.S., 397 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
26. Id. at 679.
27. Id.
28. In U.S. v. Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236, 1240-43 (D.C. Cir. 1970), Judge Fahy
stated that an expansion of Luck-Gordon might very well be in order. He suggested
that an approach similar to Model Code of Evidence Rule 106 be considered, but that
such consideration should only be undertaken by the court en banc. To date, LuckGordon has not been expanded.
29. Proposed Federal Rule 6-09 provided:
(a)
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the
crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement regardless of the punishment.
(b)
Time Limit. Evidence of conviction under this rule is inadmissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the release of the
witness from confinement, or the expiration of the period of his parole, probation, or sentence, whichever is the later date.
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Thus, Rule 6-09 necessarily rejected Luck."° Correspondingly, support for Luck in other circuits eroded. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, for example, in United States v. Escobedo3 ' discussed
the dichotomy between Rule 6-09 and Luck. The court said that it
would probably follow the proposed Federal Rules, but at any rate,
Luck would certainly not be applied as a "rule of thumb."3 2
However, the Advisory Committee's recent extensive revision of Rule
60933 appears to have given the Luck-Gordon rule a new vitality. This
version of the rule prohibits impeachment evidence of a prior crime, unless the crime involved dishonesty or false statement, or unless it was
punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year. Furthermore, the
determination of the admissibility of such a prior crime is within the
trial judge's discretion, based upon a determination of whether or not
the danger of prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of
the evidence. The provision which prohibits the admissibility of a conviction obtained more than ten years previously has been retained
from the earlier draft of Rule 609. The guidelines propounded by the
rule provide an ample framework for the application of Luck-Gordon.
An approach which, unlike proposed Rule 609, provides definitive
answers rather than leaving the matter of the impeachment of a witness
by prior convictions to the court's discretion was taken by the Model
Code of Evidence Rule 106."4 Rule 106 allows only the admission
of crimes involving dishonesty or false statements to attack the credibility of a witness. If, however, the witness is the defendant, no crimes
30. See Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior Convictions And the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, I Loyola L.J. 247 (1970).
The author finds the rationale of Rule 6-09 unconvincing, particularly as it relates to Rule 6-09's rejection of Luck-Gordon.
31. 430 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1970). The court refused to apply Luck-Gordon even
though the prior crime was substantially similar to the one for which the defendant
was on trial.
32. Id. at 19.
33. The rule provides in relevant part:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime . . . is admissible but
only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment unless (3) in either
case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the
crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible
if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or
of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date.
34. Rule 106 provides in part: "(3)
If an accused who testifies at the trial introduces no evidence for the sole purpose of supporting his credibility . . . no evidence
shall be elicited on his cross examination or be otherwise introduced against him ..
"
Uniform Rule of Evidence 21 is substantively identical: ". . . If the witness be the accused . . . no evidence of his conviction of a crime shall be admissible for the sole
purpose of impairing his credibility."
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may be introduced to impugne his credibility unless the defendant first
offers evidence on that issue."5
Rule 106, then, presupposes a slight degree of relevance to past convictions not involving dishonest conduct. The rule also presupposes
that an inordinate amount of prejudice would result from introduction
into evidence of a past conviction of the testifying defendant, irrespective of the probative value of this conviction. The presupposition is evident from the official comment on Rule 106(3):
It is generally believed that evidence of conviction of an accused
whether elicited on cross-examination or otherwise introduced,
though received only as affecting his credibility as a witness, is constantly misused by juries to prejudice him on the merits. Reports
of public defenders assert that the admissibility of such evidence is a
chief reason for the failure or refusal of the accused to take the
6
standA
In light of the fear of jury prejudice, the policy of Rule 106 is to encourage a defendant who has previously been convicted of any crime to
testify without fear of impeachment by his prior conviction. The defendant will thus have the opportunity to tell the jury his version of an
incident, or perhaps establish a vital fact. However, the prosecution
will not be completely overlooked. The State will still have the opportunity to introduce convictions for crimes most relevant to veracity if
the defendant first introduces evidence to support his credibility. Most
important to the prosecution, however, is the fact that if because of his
lack of impeachment by prior convictions, the defendant takes the stand,
the prosecution will then have the opportunity to cross-examine the
87
defendant concerning any part of his testimony.
The rationale of Luck differs basically from that of Model Code Rule
106. A defendant seeking to get the benefit of the Luck rule must
raise the issue and then meet the burden of persuading the trial judge
35.

".

.

. Under the former rule he laid his past record open for inquiry when he

became a witness, with the result that the defendant hardly dared take the stand because of the risk that he was shown to have been a bad actor in the past. By not
testifying, the defendant did not have the benefit of his own denial of guilt ....
The
policy of the new rule is that it is better to remove the fear of conviction on past
record by imposing the restriction that evidence of former conviction cannot be received except in answer to evidence which the defendant introduces to support his
character....", State v. Motley, 199 K. 335, 430 P.2d 264, 267 quoting from Gard,
Kansas Code of Civil Procedure Annotated, P. 393.

Rule 21 verbatim, K.S.A. 60-421.
36. Model Code of Evidence Rule 106(3), P. 128.
37.

".

.

Kansas has adopted Uniform

. The power of cross-examination is the most efficacious test which the

law has devised for the discovery of truth. . . . The right to be confronted with the
witness, and to sift the truth out of the mingled mass of ignorance, prejudice, passion,
and interest, in which it is very often hid, is among the very strongest bulwarks of
justice." McClesky v. Leadbetter, 1 Ga. 551, 555 (1846) quoted in V Wigmore on
Evidence Sec. 1367 (3rd ed. 1940).
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that the particular circumstances justify an exception from the general
rule of admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes.3 8
This view of Luck is concomitant with the general assumptions that
evidence of virtually all convictions is relevant to veracity, and that juries will not be unduly prejudiced by the introduction of such evidence.
Another indication that the rule of Luck requires a distinct exception to the general rule of admissibility of prior convictions is the Luck
court's construction of the District of Columbia statute. The court, in
effect, says that the phrase "conviction may be given in evidence" 9 confers discretion upon the trial judge to exclude evidence of a prior conviction. In Gordon the court refers to its construction of the statute
in Luck, implying that this construction was the only possible meaning
which could be given to the statute short of either admitting or ex40
cluding all prior convictions.
It is submitted that the court could have just as easily, and perhaps
more correctly in a semantic sense, construed the statute to vest discretion in the trial judge to admit evidence of a prior conviction. In other
words, the Luck decision could have announced that as a general rule,
prior convictions would be inadmissable for the sole purpose of impeaching the defendant-witness. The court could have then added that
upon a proper demonstration of particular circumstances (i.e. where
the probative value on the impeachment issue was very high), the
trial judge could admit evidence of prior convictions. One such example of high probative value would be a perjury conviction. The prosecution could also be given the right to introduce such evidence if the
defendant-witness offered testimony to support his credibility.
Implicit in Luck is the court's faith in the ability of limiting instructions given to the jury to remedy any prejudice toward the defendant witness. If the defendant cannot meet his burden of showing the possibility of particular jury prejudice, or demonstrate that he has a particular
need to testify, evidence of his prior conviction is admissible. The
jury is then cautioned that the evidence is not being received as substantive evidence, but rather only as it bears on the defendant's veracity.
On the other hand, Model Code Rule 106 totally prohibits the very
admission of prior convictions for purposes of impeaching the accused.
38. See note 25, supra.
39. 14 D.C. Code 305.
40. 383 F.2d 936, 941. Although the primary purpose of the statute was to remove
the common law provisions which disqualified as a witness anyone who had been convicted of a crime, the traditional construction of the statute has focused on the part
which qualifies the removal. This construction assumes that the legislature intended

to counterbalance the common law disqualification.

The assumption seems arbitrary.
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This prohibition cannot be based upon notions of the lack of probity in
any prior conviction, for the Rule allows impeachment of witnesses
other than the accused by the introduction of past convictions involving
dishonesty or false statements. 4" Therefore, by totally restricting such
106 necessarily implies
attack when the witness is the accused, Rule
42
ineffective.
are
often
that limiting instructions
Upon a first reading, the court's adoption of Proposed Federal Rule
609 in People v. Montgomery seems to be tantamount to Illinois' espousal of the Luck rule. Montgomery and Luck construed similar statutes
as conferring discretion on the trial judge to control the admission of
the evidence of past crimes. In fact, as the Advisory Committee stated
in its notes following Rule 609, that subsection (a)(3), the discretion
conferring provision, found its genesis in the Luck decision. In the
sense that Montgomery and Luck involved similar statutory constructions and that Rule 609 is grounded upon the Luck and Gordon decisions, it can indeed be claimed that Illinois has adopted Luck. However, it must be noted that Rule 609 is merely a shell, within which
very different policies and assumptions can be placed.
One of the more important considerations is whether under Rule 609
as applicable in Illinois, the rule of Evans that it is the defendant-witness's burden to establish that the conviction should not be admissible
will be followed. An initial indication that Montgomery may not adopt
41. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 106(1)(b).
42. The effectiveness of limiting instructions has been the object of much skepticism. In Bailey, supra note 29, Judge Fahy questioned the adequacy of this practice
and indicated that possibilities for prejudice were the primary reason for considering
an expansion of Luck-Gordon. The United States Supreme Court, in Bruton v. U.S.,
391 U.S. 123 (1968), considered the effectiveness of the trial judge's instruction that
the confession of one defendant was inadmissible as hearsay against a second defendant.
The court reversed the second defendant's conviction. It held that there are certain
situations in which limiting instructions will not sufficiently obviate the extreme risk of
jury prejudice. Many commentators have suggested that the impeachment of a defendant witness is such a situation, and that only by denying the admission of all past
convictions will this risk of prejudice be avoided. See, e.g., Ladd, Credibility Tests,
supra note 6, Griswald, The Long View, supra note 7, Spector, Impeachment Through
Past Convictions: A Time for Reform, 18 DePaul L. Rev. 1 (1968), Note: Impeachment of the Defendant-Witness by Prior Convictions, 12 St. Louis U.L.J. 277 (1967).
"Is there anyone so naive who could maintain that juries are endowed with superior
powers of sifting impeachment evidence from substantive evidence? One may consciously accept impeachment evidence for what it is worth, but the barbs of prejudice
possess an uncanny faculty for impressing the unconscious self. Warning judicial
instructions may carefully distinguish the uses to which particular items of proof may
be put, yet it is highly improbable that cold, judicial analysis will temper or control the
juror's very human propensity to take all things into account." Slough, Impeachment of
Witnesses: Common Law Principles and Modern Trends, 34 Indiana Law. Rev. 1
(1958). One study indicates that jurors almost always ignored the court's instruction
on the use of prior convictions and concluded that because of his record the defendant
was more likely than not guilty of the crime with which he was charged, Letter from
Dale W. Broeder in Note: Other Crimes Evidence At Trial: Of Balancing and Other
Matters, 70 Yale L.J. 763, 777 (1961).
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the Evans burden rule is the two courts' divergent views of their respective prerogatives concerning the admission of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes. Prior to Evans the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in Gordon,4 3 quoted from Hood v. United States4
explaining that:
Luck establishes only that Congress, in legislating to the effect that
prior convictions may be used to impeach, left some room for the
the play of judicial45discretion over the unfolding circumstances of
the immediate trial.
It is obvious, then, that the Luck-Gordon-Evans court clearly views
its doctrine as an exception made available to the judiciary solely
through lack of exercise of legislative prerogative. The Supreme
Court of Illinois, on the other hand, seems to indicate that even the
language of the statute might not be all-determinative. The court quotes
from Wigmore's discussion of the rule that only facts having probative
value are admissible:
Among its innumerable indirect effects . . . is the doctrine that
even the Legislature cannot establish a rule of decision which will
deprive the Judiciary of its power to investigate the facts by rational
46
methods.
The court then reviewed the probative value of Montgomery's prior conviction for purposes of his credibility and concluded that there was no
"factual or psychological" support for the proposition that it was relevant to his veracity. 47 The quotation from Wigmore 41 and the subsequent determination by the court of the prior conviction's lack of probity
could be interpreted to imply that even if the Illinois statute 49 had
stated "shall" instead of "may", the court, nonetheless would have
reached the same result. At the very least, the court's divergence in
view from that of the Luck-Gordon-Evans court suggests a possibility
that Illinois, in adhering to "[T]he rules directed to prevent the jury
from substituting passion and prejudice, instead of reasoning, as the
foundation of their conclusion. .
,,50 will consider equally an evaluation of possible jury prejudice and the probity involved in admitting a
prior conviction. However, the thrust of Montgomery is not merely
to make probity and prejudice twin factors to be considered when the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

383 F.2d at 939 n.5.
365 F.2d 949, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Id.
I Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 9 (2nd ed. 1940), at 260.
People v. Montgomery, 47 Il. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
Supra note 47.
See note 3, supra.
Supra note 44.
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accused seeks to testify. The court quoted with approval the comments
of Dean Griswold that the effectiveness of instructions limiting evidence
of a defendant's prior crimes solely to the issue of credibility is a fiction
in which the courts indulge. 5
The court also referred to the trial
judge's statement that Montgomery would be convicted by the jury on
the basis of his 21 year old conviction if the other evidence was of equal
weight. Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge
that the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction was "unmistakable".
This implies that, limiting instructions notwithstanding, evidence of the
accused's past crimes is inherently prejudicial on the issue of guilt.
Thus, Montgomery repudiates the notion that proper limiting instructions
generally protect against the possibility of undue jury bias arising from
such evidence. The ten year limitation on the admissibility of all prior
convictions which is imposed by the adopted version of Rule 609 does
not involve the issue of jury prejudice. The Rule's time limitation
merely fixes an outer limit, beyond which the probity of any conviction is considered negligible. It should be noted, however, that the
court still found "unmistakable" the prejudical effect of a conviction
more than twice the age of the "outer limit" for probative value.
A corollary of the court's concern with jury prejudice is a policy which
will encourage the defendant to testify. Hence, the court appeared concerned about the possible "constitutional difficulties" created by the requirement that, at the prosecution's discretion, all past convictions be admitted to impeach the defendant. The prejudice or potential prejudice, of a jury can affect the defendant's case whether he ultimately decides to testify or not. If the defendant chooses to testify, and is impeached, the danger is that the jury will view the impeachment as
evidence of guilt, not lack of credibility. 52 Conversely, when the defendant chooses not to testify, fearing the possibility of prejudice stemming from his impeachment, he faces an important but more subtle danger. The non-testifying defendant has lost his only opportunity to
deny directly the testimony of other witnesses and tell his version of
the story. Thus, the danger exists that false testimony will go uncontroverted merely because the defendant fears the potential jury prejudice
flowing from his impeachment. The defendant also faces the possibility of a conscious or unconscious inference of guilt by the jury solely
because he has not elected to testify. The strong possibility of prejudice
51. Supra note 7.
52. Note, Procedural Protection of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity
to Commit Crime, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 426, 441 (1964).
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facing the defendant with a record of prior convictions has caused one
author to suggest that their introduction as impeachment evidence is
unconstitutional.5 3 It was contended this method of impeachment
might violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Further, it may deny the. accused the privilege against self-incrimination
and the right to trial by an impartial jury, guarantees afforded by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth.5 4 Whether or not this method of impeaching the accused
is unconstitutional, it is important to note the concern of the Montgomery
court in protecting the defendant from extreme jury prejudice.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in applying the
Luck-Gordon-Evans standard, has considered the possibility of unfair
jury prejudice to be but one of the factors which the trial judge must
weigh. However, before the issue of prejudice could be considered the
defendant was required to present sufficiently cogent reasons for his
testimony to warrant an "exemption" from the permitted impeachment.55
Absent special circumstances, then, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia must assume that there is insufficient likelihood that a jury
will be unfairly influenced by prior crimes evidence. Thus, Montgomery and Luck-Gordon-Evans differ on the incidence and scope of
unfair jury prejudice. Once this difference is recognized, it becomes
evident that the burden which is placed upon the accused of demonstrating that the possibility of prejudice outweighs probity will similarly
differ. A burden of showing that prejudice outweighs probity is more
easily met where, as in Montgomery, the court assumes that prejudice
is virtually inherent under such circumstances. Therefore, the "rule of
thumb" of Gordon that crimes involving dishonest conduct are generally
highly probative may be too broad for the Montgomery rationale.
Conversely, the approach of Model Code Rule 106 is too narrow. The
inadmissibility of all prior convictions if the defendant offers no evi53. Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 173 (1968).
54. Id. Although the question has not been decided by the Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Warren's dissent in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 577-78 (1967), seems
to indicate there is no constitutional violation. In Spencer the court held constitutional
a Texas recidivist statute which allows a jury to consider the defendant's prior convictions for purposes of sentencing but not for purposes of determining guilt. The dissenting Warren thought the statute to be violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He contrasted the prejudicial-probative balance in the recidivist case with that of impeachment by prior convictions and suggested that the
probative value of prior convictions to credibility outweighed any prejudice. While this
pronouncement has been interpreted to bar Fourteenth Amendment arguments, it has
not been read as giving approval to the existing rule, Bailey, supra note 29 at 1242.
Thus, Spencer should be limited to the constitutional issue.
55. Supra note 26 at 679.
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dence to support his credibility assumes that no conviction can ever be
more probative than prejudicial. Under any construction, however, both
the Illinois statute and proposed Federal Rule 609 do state that there
can be circumstances where prior convictions are admissible on the issue
of a defendant-witness' credibility. Thus, the Illinois court could not totally adopt the Model Code's complete ban upon such convictions.
Furthermore, had the court felt that all prior convictions were inadmissible on the issue of credibility, its determination that "may" conferred
discretion upon the trial judge would be a non sequitur. Finally, any
analysis of Rule 106's concern with jury prejudice must be tempered by
an additional provision allowing the trial judge or the prosecutor in his
summation to comment upon any failure of the defendant to testify.56
This allowance of comment was thought to serve as an added factor to
induce the defendant to appear on the witness stand. 7 It follows then,
that the Model Code is concerned with jury prejudice only as it is relevant to discouraging a defendant from testifying. On the other hand,
Montgomery implied a policy which seeks to avoid jury bias whether
or not the defendant does choose to testify.
CONCLUSION

Since both the Luck-Gordon-Evans doctrine and Model Code of Evidence Rule 106 are inapposite, a middle ground is in order. It is submitted that a rule opposite to that of Evans is particularly indicated. The
rule would operate as a presumption, in effect, that all prior convictions
are sufficiently prejudicial to a defendant-witness to warrant their exclusion. However, the trial judge could exercise his discretion by admitting those convictions which were so probative as to compel an exception from the general rule of inadmissibility. Montgomery does not
state which conviction might warrant such an exception. s Crimes bearing directly upon testimonial deception should be normally admissible
56. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 201(3). The rule permitting comment upon
defendant's failure to testify was found to violate the defendant's privilege against self-

incrimination in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).

Without the countervail-

ing force of this rule, the likelihood that Rule 106 will be adopted by a state legislature
is almost non-existent. See, e.g. Hawthorne, supra note 12 at 687-88, n.l.
57. This was the official reason given by the Model Code, p. 106. At least one
author of Uniform Rule 21, thinks the Rule is warranted in its own right and should
be adopted even without the provision for comment, McCormick, Some Highlights of
the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 559, 569 (1955).
58. In People v. Sawyer, 48 Ill. 2d 127, 268 N.E.2d 689 (1971), the Illinois Supreme
Court held that under the Montgomery rationale a prior conviction for prostitution would
not afford a basis for impeaching a witness of the State, but that a prior conviction for
possession of narcotics would afford such a basis. However, since the witness in

Sawyer was not the accused or even a witness testifying on behalf of the accused, the
admission of a prior conviction could not prejudice the accused on the issue of his guilt.
Thus Sawyer's pronouncements should not be extended beyond impeachment of a prosecution witness.
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to impeach a defendant-witness. 9 The logic of admitting such crimes
is unassailable, for they are by definition the most relevant to credibility.
Sufficient flexibility could then be retained to enable the trial judge to
make other exceptions. Regardless of the eventual guidelines established by the court, the decision of Montgomery offers an opportunity to create a doctrine which will far surpass Luck-Gordon-Evans
in limiting the use of prior convictions for impeaching a defendant.
WILLIAM

E.

HIRSCHBERG

59. The author of Montgomery is already on record as favoring this rule: "When
the accused takes the stand in his own behalf, he should, in my opinion, be subject to
impeachment only by proof of past crimes which directly bear on testimonial deception, such as perjury. Past convictions not in this category should not be admissible
unless they are relevant for some purpose other than impeachment. . . . The contrary
and current practice lies close to the borders of the due process clause, and it should
be eliminated."
Shaefer, Police Interrogation and The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 N.W.U. L. Rev. 506, 512 (1966).

